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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
We have inherited the world as our predecessors have left it for us and we, in turn, will pass it 
on to the people who will come after us. Can we do as we please with it, whatever the 
consequences for future generations? Or do we owe duties of justice to those who will live in 
the future? If so, what is the foundation of these duties? In this thesis, I will focus on one 
proposed foundation, which grounds duties of justice in shared coercive institutions. I will 
investigate whether it is possible to claim that we have duties of justice to future people on the 
basis of this theory. That would mean that we cannot just do what we please with the world 
and the institutions that we inherited, but that the moral acceptability of our actions is limited 
by the interests of future generations. Below, I will first introduce the topic of this thesis in 
more detail and explain why this is important to research. Then, I will present the research 
question and my strategy for answering it. 
 
1.1 Problem introduction and gap in literature 
 
Traditionally, the debate about distributive justice has been focused mainly on the state. How 
should benefits and burdens be allocated within a society? In the last decades, a debate has 
developed about distributive justice outside of the state, looking to extend the scope of justice 
in space (global justice) and in time (intergenerational justice). Do principles of justice also 
apply beyond the borders of a state, to foreigners and to future people? The fields of global 
justice and intergenerational justice have so far been largely separated; little has been written 
on the connection between them. Yet, it would be instructive to investigate parallels and 
differences between issues of global justice and intergenerational justice for the sake of a 
better understanding of the issues and of consistency.1 This thesis aims to connect these 
debates at the foundation of theorizing justice: the grounds of justice. This debate addresses 
what conditions ground obligations of justice. How those theories on grounding obligations of 
justice operate intergenerationally is a relatively underexplored topic.2 
 
This thesis focuses on one proposed ground of justice: coercion. Coercion theorists argue that 
the scope of justice is limited to those people who share coercive (legal) institutions. The 
existing literature on coercion as the ground of justice focuses on the question whether 
relevant forms of coercion only exist within a state or also internationally. Originally, the 
‘coercion’ ground of justice has been used to defend statist conclusions, recently by Blake and 
Nagel.3 However, multiple philosophers have replied that coercion as the ground of justice 
does not necessarily lead to statist conclusions. Instead, they have defended that relevant 
forms of coercion exist globally, thereby arguing for extending the scope of justice to the 
global realm.4 
 
 
1See e.g. Gosseries 2014. 
2 See e.g. Meijers 2018. 
3 Blake 2001, Nagel 2005. 
4 Abizadeh 2007, Valentini 2011, Cohen and Sabel 2006 and arguably Pogge 2005 and Van Parijs 2007. 
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So far, little attention has been given to the question whether relevant forms of coercion also 
exist in the intergenerational realm. In this thesis, I will focus on that question, thereby aiming 
to fill part of the gap in the literature. Except one paper by Siba Harb, the literature has failed 
to pick up on this question completely.5 I will expand on the topic and investigate the 
implications of the coercion view for the intergenerational domain. Does it allow for the 
extension of the scope of justice to the intergenerational domain? 
 
One can use the intergenerational domain as a way to test the resilience of a theory of justice. 
If it does well in accounting for our considered moral judgements in the intergenerational 
realm, this is an argument in favor of the consistency of this theory in general.6 The starting 
point of this thesis will be the intuition that we do have obligations of justice to future people.  
 
This intuition has been expressed earlier by Tim Mulgan and Brian Barry. Mulgan has 
proposed a minimal test for political theories.7 A political theory fails the test when it 
concludes that current generations have no obligations of justice to future generations. He 
claims that this outcome is inconsistent: “It seems bizarre to conclude that because future 
generations are at our mercy, we can behave towards them as we please. Many people will 
feel that, far from being beyond the realm of justice, cases of such extreme power imbalances 
are precisely where justice is most required.”8 Barry agrees: “I find it impossible to believe 
that it can be right to disregard totally the interests of even remotely future generations, […]. 
If I am correct in saying that it is an implication of the three theories of morality considered 
earlier that there are no obligations to distant future generations, they too have to be 
rejected”.9  
 
In this thesis, I will discuss whether coercion theory can conform to these intuitions, taking 
them as a starting point without defending them. A view which grounds obligations of justice 
in coercion is only able to do so when it can plausibly claim that relevant forms of coercion 
exist in the intergenerational realm. Only if this claim can be made, the scope of justice 
extends to future people. If not, the intuition cannot be accommodated and coercion theorists 
are faced with a dilemma: let go of the coercion view, or give up the intuition.  
 
1.2 Research question and roadmap 
 
The main research question is:  
 
Can a view which grounds obligations of justice in coercion plausibly claim that relevant 
forms of coercion exist in the intergenerational realm?  
 
 
5 Harb 2014. 
6 Gosseries and Meyer 2009, p. 5. 
7 Mulgan 2001. 
8 Mulgan 2001, p. 287. 
9 Barry 1977, p. 249. 
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The thesis will be structured as follows: In Chapter two, I will explain the accounts of 
coercion theory by Michael Blake and Thomas Nagel. Since they are the most prominent 
recent defenders of the coercion approach, I will take their accounts of coercion theory as the 
starting point of my enquiry in the rest of the thesis. In Chapter three, I will examine the 
implications of the coercion view for thinking about intergenerational justice. First, I will 
explain the most important features of the intergenerational domain and briefly point out some 
implications these features might have for the scope of distributive justice. Then, I will return 
to Nagel and Blake and explain the requirements for a justice-triggering coercive relationship 
according to their account of coercion theory. I will use these requirements as a starting point 
for my discussion on whether it is possible to regard our relationship with future people as 
coercive. I will explore three options for establishing such a coercive relationship with future 
people: coercion through legal, environmental and financial mechanisms. In the course of the 
chapter, we will see that we need to make certain assumptions about the correct interpretation 
of coercion theory to successfully establish a justice-triggering coercive relationship between 
present and future people. In some instances, these assumptions divert from our starting point, 
Blake and Nagel’s coercion account. At the end of this chapter, we will have an idea of what 
an account of coercion needs to look like to be applicable to our relationship with future 
people. In Chapter four, I will assess whether the assumptions that I made in Chapter three are 
plausible. I will argue that the ‘intergenerational coercion account’ is plausible when we take 
the effect on freedom as the core of coercion. This focus on freedom allows for a broader 
definition of coercion than is commonly used. However, broadening the conception of 
coercion to establish a coercive relationship between present and future generations might 
have consequences for the international domain as well. 
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Chapter 2: Blake and Nagel on coercion as the ground of justice 
 
Introduction 
This chapter lays the foundation for the rest of this thesis by explaining the content of Blake 
and Nagel’s accounts of coercion as the ground of justice. Firstly, I will briefly describe the 
context of the debate in which Blake and Nagel have developed their accounts. I will specify 
which problem of distributive justice they focus on and explain some conceptual distinctions. 
Secondly, I will discuss Blake’s account of coercion as the ground of justice, which is based 
on the liberal value of autonomy. Thirdly, I will discuss Nagel’s account of coercion, which 
emphasizes co-authorship. Overall, the chapter aims to clarify why both authors claim that 
coercion is the correct ground of justice. In this way, the chapter will provide the necessary 
tools to consider the implications of coercion theory in the intergenerational domain in the 
next chapter. 
 
2.1 The ground of justice: context of the debate 
 
The ‘coercion-views’ of Blake and Nagel are situated in the debate on distributive justice, 
which is concerned with the just distribution of benefits and burdens across a certain group of 
people. Often, duties of distributive justice are contrasted with humanitarian duties, which are 
seen as less demanding and are usually given less priority. More specifically, distributive 
justice is concerned with the relative amount of holdings of people within a certain group and 
humanitarian duties with absolute deprivation. Barry phrases it as follows: “Humanity 
requires that we respond to other’s needs whereas justice requires that we give them their 
due. If something is due to you, you do not have to show that you need it”.10  
 
We can broadly distinguish three different questions a theory of justice must answer: the 
scope question, the metric question and the pattern question. The metric question asks what 
the content of our distributive obligations is; what kinds of things must we distribute? Various 
options have been defended, such as welfare, resources and capabilities. The pattern question 
asks how much we owe to other people. Rawls’s answer was egalitarian; we should distribute 
the benefits and burdens of our society equally, but also prioritarian and sufficientarian views 
have been defended. In this thesis, we focus on the scope question; which ‘groups’ of people 
stand in a justice relation towards each other? Traditionally, the debate about distributive 
justice has focused on what justice means within a state. However, nowadays a lively debate 
exists on whether the scope of justice should be extended beyond the state. Crucial to the 
scope question is the underlying ‘grounding’ question: what are the conditions that determine 
whether we owe people obligations of justice?11 
 
The discussion on the ground of justice can be divided into two main positions, interactional 
and non-interactional.12 Theorists who defend interactional views believe that the ground of 
 
10 Barry 1978, p. 205. 
11 Meijers 2018. 
12 Meijers (2018) uses these terms. I will use these throughout the thesis. Related distinctions are ‘associational’ 
and ‘humanity-centered’ (Caney 2011; Axelsen 2014) and ‘relational’ and ‘non-relational’ (Sangiovanni 2007; 
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justice can be located in a particular relationship between a certain group of people. Those 
who defend non-interactional views believe that those relations are irrelevant to the existence 
of obligations of justice. Usually, these theorists argue that our common humanity suffices to 
bring about such obligations.13 Interactionalists disagree about the nature of the relevant 
relationship that triggers claims of distributive justice. Three common alternatives are 
cooperation, culture and coercion.14 The cooperation view holds that we have duties of 
reciprocity to people with whom we are engaged in social cooperation for mutual advantage.15 
The culture view defends that solidarity between compatriots sharing a common culture 
brings about duties of distributive justice.16 Coercion theorists argue that the presence of 
coercive legal and political institutions triggers demands of distributive justice.17 
 
From these different grounds of justice, conclusions are drawn about the scope of justice. The 
scope of justice encompasses the group of people to whom the ground of justice applies. To 
oversimplify, non-relational grounds are usually used to defend a global scope of justice, 
which is called cosmopolitanism. In contrast, relational grounds are commonly used to defend 
statist conclusions about the scope of justice, which means that extensive duties of distributive 
justice are only owed to compatriots. However, a number of authors has denied that relational 
grounds of justice necessarily lead to statist conclusions about the scope of justice. Especially 
the coercion and cooperation grounds have been used to defend cosmopolitan conclusions.18  
 
In this thesis, I will focus on one relational ground of justice: coercion. Below, I will discuss 
the positions of Blake and Nagel, who have defended the coercion view most prominently. I 
will discuss them separately, because while they arrive at similar (statist) conclusions, their 
reasoning differs. 
 
2.2 Blake: state coercion  
 
Liberalism and impartiality 
The problem Blake addresses is the paradox between maintaining the liberal commitment to 
the moral equality of all persons, while at the same time upholding a system of sovereign 
states with major differences between them regarding liberal rights, liberties and material 
wealth. Blake claims that this paradox can be solved in a way that makes impartiality 
compatible with the application of certain principles of distributive justice only within the 
borders of a state.19 The reason for only applying these principles domestically cannot be that 
we care more about our compatriots than about foreigners, since that would mean being 
 
Risse 2012). Caney notes that associational accounts are not identical with relational accounts, a term that 
Andrea Sangiovanni uses (Caney 2011, p. 506-507). Caney’s terms can be used interchangeably with Meijers’, 
but for consistency I will use Meijers’ terms.  
13 See: Axelsen 2014, p. 58. 
14 See: Meijers 2018. 
15 See: Beitz 1999 and Sangiovanni 2007. 
16 See: Miller 2005. 
17 See: Nagel 2005, Blake 2001. Arguably, Rawls’s position can be interpreted as coercion theory. See: Valentini 
2011, p. 207; Abizadeh 2007. 
18 See: Valentini 2011; Abizadeh 2007; Cohen & Sabel 2006 (coercion) and Beitz 1999 (cooperation). 
19 Blake 2001, p. 257. 
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‘partial’ and thus be incompatible with universal moral equality. Blake’s solution is that what 
may look like partiality, is actually a complex application of an impartial principle and thus 
compatible with liberalism.20  
 
Autonomy and coercion 
Blake takes concern for the universal protection of individual autonomy as a central value of 
liberalism. From this concern, Blake derives his impartial liberal principle: “all human beings 
have the moral entitlement to exist as autonomous agents, and therefore have entitlements to 
those circumstances and conditions under which this is possible.”21 The value of autonomy is 
central to Blake’s argument. He takes autonomy to mean that individuals have (partial) 
authorship over their own lives, that they are able to choose their own life plan.22 This is 
possible when individuals have an adequate set of options which provides real choices.23 
Coercion is prima facie incompatible with autonomy, because the coercer denies the ability of 
those coerced to choose for themselves by manipulating the set of options, thereby 
“[reducing] the will of one person to the will of another”.24 According to Blake, coercion is in 
principle forbidden by his liberal autonomy-principle both in itself and because it disrespects 
the individual as an autonomous agent.25 
 
State coercion and justification 
With this reasoning, Blake aimed to establish that coercion is problematic from a liberal point 
of view, because it infringes on autonomy. Next, he shows that in some cases, coercion can 
nevertheless be morally justified, namely through principles of distributive justice. In his 
enquiry into justification, Blake focuses on coercion by the state. There are two reasons for 
this focus. Firstly, Blake is committed to ‘institutional theory’, which takes the existing 
institutions as a given and then proceeds to ask how they could be justified.26 In the world as 
it is, state coercion is very impactful, so we need to ask how this can be justified. Blake 
contrasts this form of theorizing with non-institutional theory, which asks what institutions we 
would endorse if the world were a blank slate. Secondly, while Blake finds coercion prima 
facie morally problematic because it threatens autonomy, he is also convinced that state 
coercion is necessary for living autonomous lives.27 The absence of a system of rules, backed 
up by force, would undermine the ability of individuals to fulfill their life plans. This is why 
Blake needs to justify state coercion, instead of prohibiting it, as anarchists defend. Blake is 
specifically concerned with the justification of state coercion through civil law. The areas of 
civil law - contract law, property law and taxation law28 - are coercive because adjudication of 
 
20 According to the principle that everyone should have the required amount of food, giving a large wrestler 
more than his small assistant is impartial, even though giving people unequal amounts of food seems partial at 
first. (Blake 2001, p. 260-261).  
21 Blake 2001, p. 267. 
22 Blake 2001, p. 267, drawing on Joseph Raz’s notion of autonomy. 
23 Blake emphasizes that it is not required for autonomy that the set of options is maximized, but that it is 
adequate (Blake 2001, p. 269). 
24 Blake 2001, p. 268, referring to Raz. 
25 Blake 2001, p. 268. 
26 Blake 2001, p. 261-262.  
27 See: Valentini 2011, p. 206. 
28 Note that taxation law is technically public law. 
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disputes in these areas may result in enforceable court decisions. This means these rules are 
backed by force and form a prima facie infringement on the principle of liberal autonomy.29  
 
Blake proposes that the state’s coercive system of laws could be justified through Scanlon’s 
notion of hypothetical consent. Hypothetical consent may be assumed to be given when the 
agent that is coerced could not reasonably reject the coercive rule in question.30 Blake 
explains that the system of laws creates ‘a pattern of entitlements’.31 It determines who may 
hold what kinds of property and entitlements and how these may be transferred. The resulting 
pattern will be advantageous for some, while others do poorly. Justification of the coercive 
system of laws requires that none of the individuals that are subjected to it could reasonably 
reject the system, including the worst off. According to Blake, people who do poorly under 
the system would nevertheless consent to it when they have reason to believe that they would 
not be better off under a different system. This reason may be provided by introducing 
principles of (egalitarian) distributive justice.32 Blake himself thinks that this hypothetical 
scenario would result in the adoption of a Rawlsian difference principle, but even if someone 
would disagree with this specific principle, Blake claims he can still maintain that justification 
would inevitably lead to principles that constrain relative deprivation.33 After all, coercion 
must also be justified to the least well-off in the society and they will only consent when their 
relative deprivation is constrained. By introducing principles of distributive justice that those 
coerced would hypothetically consent to, the state places them “in a situation as close as 
possible to that one [they] would have freely chosen.”34 By respecting the agency of those 
concerned in this way, the prima facie infringement of autonomy of the coercion is rectified.35 
 
Coercion and the international realm 
So far, Blake hopes to have established that the reason (egalitarian) obligations of distributive 
justice exist within the state is to justify the state’s coercive legal system; their function is to 
reconcile the coercion to which the state subjects its members with the liberal principle of 
autonomy. In other words: obligations of distributive justice are triggered by this specific type 
of state coercion. Next, Blake claims that this type of coercion does not exist globally and 
therefore, these special obligations do not arise on a global level. Cosmopolitan critics have 
argued that there is also coercion internationally and therefore principles of distributive justice 
must also apply globally. Blake does not dispute that coercive practices might exist in the 
international realm, but denies the cosmopolitan conclusion. He argues that these coercive 
practices are not necessary for the protection of autonomy, in contrast to state coercion. So, 
instead of trying to justify this coercion, we should eliminate it. 36 Principles of egalitarian 
 
29 Blake 2001, p. 277-278. 
30 Blake 2001, p. 274. 
31 Blake 2001, p. 281. 
32 Blake 2001, p. 283. 
33 Blake 2001, p. 284. 
34 Blake 2016, p. 326. 
35 This explanation of distributive justice as ‘rectification’ is a reply to Sangiovanni’s critique that distribution as 
‘outweighing’ or ‘compensating’ cannot justify coercion (Sangiovanni 2016, p. 283-288). Blake argues that 
Sangiovanni’s options are mistakenly concerned with interests instead of agency (Blake 2016, p. 325). 
36 Blake 2011, p. 567. 
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justice would not make the coercion of marginal states by more powerful states any less 
objectionable. Or, if it could be justified, it would require a different justification.37 
 
So, principles of (egalitarian) justice do not apply globally. However, this does not imply that 
we do not owe anything to non-compatriots. Recall Blake’s impartial liberal principle of the 
global protection of autonomy. This principle requires that all individuals have a right to 
function as an autonomous agent, which includes: the absence of autonomy-undermining 
poverty, access to political institutions and justification of the coercive actions of those 
institutions.38 Because of this principle, we must refrain from actions that interfere with the 
ability of states to guarantee the individual autonomy of their citizens.39 Also, we are 
obligated to provide the conditions for autonomy abroad when states fail to do so for their 
own citizens.40 Nonetheless, the impartial liberal principle of global protection of autonomy 
only requires concern with absolute deprivation in the international realm, not with relative 
deprivation. 
 
Overview of the argument 
(P1) The commitment to individual autonomy is central to liberalism. 
(P2) The system of law within a state is coercive. 
(P3) Coercion undermines autonomy, so it needs to be eliminated or justified. 
(P4) State coercion is necessary for autonomy, so it needs to be justified. 
(P4) State coercion can be justified through hypothetical consent if principles of distributive 
justice are introduced. 
(C1) Principles of distributive justice apply domestically. 
(P5) There is no similar coercion globally that can be justified with principles of distributive 
justice 
(C2) Principles of (egalitarian) distributive justice do not apply globally 
 
2.3 Nagel: dual coercion 
 
Justice and sovereignty 
Nagel discusses the question what justice could mean on a global scale. First, he discusses the 
relation between justice and sovereignty, drawing on Thomas Hobbes’s position. Hobbes 
claimed that the realization of justice is only possible within the context of coordinated 
cooperation by a large group of people, which is made possible through a system of laws 
enforced by a sovereign.41 Individual aspiration for justice is not enough. This aspiration only 
gets practical expression when individuals have the assurance that others will also conform. 
This assurance is provided by the central government. So, the establishment of a coercive 
sovereign government is a necessary condition for achieving justice. 
 
37 Blake 2001, p. 280 
38 Blake 2013, p. 26. Blake does seem to call these duties of justice, but stresses these are different from the 
principles of domestic justice (Blake 2011, p. 555-556; Sangiovanni 2016, p. 272). 
39 Blake 2013, p. 124-125.  
40 Blake 2013, p. 27-28; Blake 2013, p. 111. 
41 Nagel 2005, p. 116. 
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The political conception  
From this Hobbesian framework, Nagel develops his political conception of justice. This 
political conception should be understood similarly to what I called the interactional position 
in paragraph 2.1, since Nagel mentions that this conception is concerned with the relation 
between a group of people and that “obligations of justice arise as a result of a special 
relation”.42 Specifically, the relation that Nagel finds to be generating duties of justice is the 
relation between fellow citizens under a coercive central authority. Since this special relation 
is not shared with the rest of humanity, requirements of justice do not apply to the world as a 
whole.43 
 
Nagel then continues to explain his political conception. Rights and obligations of 
socioeconomic justice arise in virtue of being fellow citizens “in a collective enterprise of 
coercively imposed legal and political institutions.”44 In Rawlsian terms, the morally arbitrary 
inequalities between citizens that are generated in this system of laws and political 
institutions, need to be reduced. However, Nagel observes that this cannot be the whole story, 
since being a member of a certain society is in itself arbitrary.45 How can membership of a 
society you ‘happen to live in’ form a valid presumption against arbitrariness within that 
society? Nagel’s solution is that members in a political society are not only subject to 
coercion by the central authority: they are also joint authors of the coercive system.46 Because 
our society acts and takes decisions in our name, we become responsible for them. This makes 
us also responsible for the arbitrary inequalities that are caused by these decisions. And since 
we are responsible for them, we should be given justification for them.47 In short, Nagel 
defends a dual view of coercion: required is being a subject and also a partial author of state 
coercion.48 These requirements are met in the domestic situation, so principles of justice exist 
within the state. 
 
The international realm 
According to Nagel, obligations of justice do not exist internationally. Nagel acknowledges 
that international institutions and widespread global cooperation exist, but denies that this 
leads to globally applicable duties of socioeconomic justice. These institutions do not meet his 
two criteria: coercion and authorship. A state is coercive in regard to its citizens, because it 
imposes its system on them involuntarily. In contrast, international organizations and 
cooperative agreements are voluntary. They are realized by bargaining between independent 
parties.49 These institutions and arrangements also do not meet the criterion of authorship. 
They do not act or are enacted in the name of individuals in a way that makes individuals 
 
42 Nagel 2005, p. 120-121. 
43 Nagel 2005, p. 121. At least not until the whole world “comes to be governed by a unified sovereign power” 
(p. 121). 
44 Nagel 2005, p. 128. 
45 Nagel 2005, p. 128. 
46 Nagel 2005, p. 128.  
47 Nagel 2005, p. 130. 
48 I derive the term ‘dual view’ from Harb 2014, p. 315. 
49 Nagel 2005, p. 138. 
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responsible.50 The relationship of individuals to international organizations is indirect, 
mediated by their respective states. State borders are also not coercive in a relevant way, 
because although they may have coercive effects on non-compatriots, this coercion does not 
take place in their name. Nagel also rejects that there is a sliding scale along which 
obligations of distributive justice become more extensive as international independence 
enlarges.51 As long as no global sovereign power is installed, no obligations of socioeconomic 
justice are triggered internationally. This position is understandable from his Hobbesian 
framework, in which justice is only possible under a sovereign government. 
 
Our only obligations to non-compatriots follow from minimal humanitarian morality. Wealthy 
states owe minimal assistance to those who are in absolute need. Practically, this means that 
we should not interfere with other states if that would violate basic human rights and that we 
should create some institutions, enabling us to prevent absolute deprivation internationally. 
However, these duties are separate from demands of justice, which are concerned with the 
relative conditions of people.52 
 
Overview of the argument 
(P1) The existence of a coercive sovereign authority puts individuals in a special relation 
towards each other, which is characterized by (1) shared involuntary subjection to this 
authority, and (2) co-authorship of the coercively imposed system. 
(P2) This special relation is a necessary and sufficient condition to trigger obligations of 
distributive justice. 
(P3) This special relation exists between citizens in a state. 
(C1) Nationally, obligations of distributive justice are triggered. 
(P4) Globally, individuals do not share this special relation. 
(C2) Globally, no obligations of justice are triggered. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed Blake and Nagel’s accounts of coercion as the ground of 
justice. Both authors defend that obligations of distributive justice are grounded in state 
coercion. According to them, state coercion provides the best explanation for the existence of 
principles of distributive justice. It is not only a sufficient condition for obligations of 
distributive justice, but also a necessary condition.53 Principles of egalitarian justice are 
necessary to justify the coercive practices of the state to its citizens (and co-authors). From 
this ground of justice, Blake and Nagel draw statist conclusions about the scope of justice: 
only compatriots stand in a relationship of justice towards each other. Internationally, we do 
have duties to assist people in absolute need. These duties do not depend on any special 
relationship and are concerned with absolute deprivation, not with relative deprivation.  
 
 
50 The exclusion of ‘pure coercion’ has led to criticism from multiple authors. See chapter three. 
51 See a discussion on this ‘discontinuous view’ in: Cohen and Sabel 2006, p. 162-164. 
52 Nagel 2005, p. 118-119. International duties “do not merit the full name of justice” (Nagel 2005, p. 122). 
53 Mainly the claim that coercion is a necessary condition for obligations of distributive justice has received 
criticism. See for example: MacKay 2016, Sangiovanni 2007, Caney 2011.  
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Blake and Nagel’s views diverge slightly on what makes state coercion relevant, in contrast to 
other types of coercion. Blake focuses on the effects on distribution that the state’s legal 
system has, namely creating a ‘pattern of entitlements’, while also emphasizing that state 
coercion is necessary for autonomy, in contrast to international coercion. Nagel, on the other 
hand, singles out state coercion as the relevant form of coercion because it does not only 
subject individuals to coercion, but also makes citizens authors of that coercion. That fact 
triggers a special justification duty on the part of the state, which is fulfilled by principles of 
egalitarian distributive justice. 
 
In the next chapters, I will analyze the implications of the coercion view for the 
intergenerational realm. 
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Chapter 3: Coercion in the intergenerational domain? 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will examine the implications of the coercion view for thinking about 
intergenerational justice. In the previous chapter, we have seen that Nagel and Blake’s 
coercion accounts on the ground of justice lead to statist conclusions on the scope of justice. 
Justice-triggering acts of coercion only exist within the state, which means that 
comprehensive (egalitarian) obligations of justice are restricted to the boundaries of the state. 
The scope of egalitarian justice does not extend to the global realm. The intergenerational 
domain can be seen as another ‘extension’ of domestic justice. In this chapter, I will use Blake 
and Nagel’s accounts of coercion as a starting point for examining if we can claim that there 
is a coercive relationship between present and future people that triggers principles of justice.  
 
In paragraph one, I will explain the crucial features of the intergenerational domain: what 
makes relations between contemporaries different from relations between non-contemporaries 
and what implications might those differences have for the scope of distributive justice? In 
paragraph two, I will return to Nagel and Blake and explain the requirements for a justice-
triggering coercive relationship according to their account of coercion theory.  In paragraph 
three, I will discuss two general difficulties for establishing intergenerational coercion. In the 
final three paragraphs, I will present three options which potentially create an 
intergenerational coercive relationship: coercion through legal, environmental and financial 
mechanisms. In the course of this chapter, we will see that making certain assumptions about 
the correct interpretation of coercion theory is necessary to successfully establish a justice-
triggering coercive relationship between present and future people. In some instances, these 
assumptions divert from our starting point, Blake and Nagel’s coercion account. At the end of 
this chapter, we will have an idea of what an account of coercion needs to look like to be 
applicable to our relationship with future people. In chapter four, I will discuss whether this 
‘intergenerational coercion account’ is plausible. 
 
3.1 The intergenerational domain: what is new? 
 
This paragraph outlines the concepts that are necessary for thinking about what justice might 
require between different generations. In this thesis, I focus on the relations between non-
overlapping generations: between people who are alive right now and a distant future 
generation. For these questions, the term ‘generation’ refers to a certain birth cohort.54 
 
Our relationship to future generations is essentially determined by two features about the 
natural world: time’s arrow and period-lockedness.55 Time is unidirectional and members of 
one generation cannot travel to another generation’s period in time; they are ‘locked’ within 
their own time period. From these features follow three important characteristics of our 
 
54 The term generation is also used to refer to age groups, particularly for thinking about questions regarding 
overlapping generations. See: Meijers 2018. 
55 Gosseries 2014, p. 96-97. 
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relations to future people: a lack of direct reciprocity, unequal power relations, and 
uncertainty.56 Firstly, among people who do not live in the same time period, it is not possible 
to engage in co-operation for mutual advantage. Because of the unidirectionality of time, it is 
possible for present generations to pass goods on to future generations, but not the other way 
around.57 Note that direct reciprocity is possible between overlapping generations: a younger 
and an older generation living during the same time period. Secondly, the power relation 
between present and future generations is necessarily asymmetrical. Present generations can 
exercise power over future generations in different ways. For instance, they can make it very 
costly for future generations not to continue the projects they started, or they can use policies 
that diminish the interests of future generations. The choices of present generations even 
determine how many and which future persons will be born. This can be done directly by 
employing population policies, but many of our other actions also have effects on who will be 
born in the future.58 Future generations cannot exercise power over present generations in any 
of these ways.59 Thirdly, since we cannot travel to the future, nor communicate with future 
people in any other way, there are many things we do not know about the future. This 
uncertainty increases as we try to look further into the future, making it harder to answer 
distributive questions.60 
 
In the light of these characteristics, it is not evident that we (can) have obligations of justice to 
future generations. According to Dworkin, formulating our obligations to future generations 
in terms of justice is misleading.61 Two main challenges for intergenerational justice can 
explain Dworkin’s skepticism: the non-existence challenge and the non-identity challenge. 
The non-existence challenge questions the possibility of having obligations to future people, 
because they do not exist yet.62 Maybe obligations only make sense when they are owed to 
people who currently exist. A possible response to this challenge is that obligations to future 
people do not depend on the particular identity of those people.63 Meyer argues that since it is 
likely that future people will come into existence and that they will have rights when they do 
and it is clear that our present actions influence their capabilities to exercise those rights, we 
can presently have the obligation not to violate those future rights. The non-identity problem 
arises from the fact that the choices that we make now and that will affect the future, are often 
‘different people choices’.64 Those choices will affect which people come into existence in the 
future. The challenge that arises is the following: how is it possible to violate an obligation to 
a future person by implementing a certain policy, when that person would not be born at all if 
the policy had not been implemented?65 The standard notion of harm is comparative. A person 
 
56 See: Meyer 2016, par. 1. 
57 Barry 1978, p. 238; Meijers 2018. 
58 Allegedly, relationships resulting from the Erasmus program have led to the birth of over 1.000.000 babies. 
See: Meyer 2016, par. 1. 
59 See: Barry 1977, p. 243-247; Barry 1978, p. 224. 
60 See: Gosseries and Meyer 2009, p. 4. Barry stresses that while evidently, we cannot act on what we do not 
know, that does not mean we should not act on what we do know (or can estimate). Barry 1997, p. 247-248. 
61 Dworkin 1994, pp. 77-78.  
62 Gosseries and Meyer 2009, p. 3. 
63 Meyer 2016, par. 2.1. 
64 Meyer 2016, par. 1. 
65 Meijers 2018. 
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is harmed by a certain action when this action has made him worse off than he was before. 
However, if a person’s existence depends on that action, this comparison is not possible.66 
There are different potential responses to the non-identity problem, such as employing a 
different notion of harm or abandoning the ‘person-affecting’ view, which entails that 
something can only be good or bad if it is good or bad for someone.67 These two challenges 
present a problem for all theories of justice’s applicability in the intergenerational domain, 
regardless of the ground of justice they are based on. If no solution is found, not only coercion 
theory but all other theories of intergenerational justice are practically useless in the 
intergenerational domain. In this thesis, I will assume that a solution can be found for these 
challenges, and I will focus on the issues that are specific to coercion theory.  
 
There are also features of the intergenerational realm that pose greater challenges for the 
applicability of some grounds of justice in the intergenerational realm than for others. In 
contrast to humanity-based views, interactional views such as the coercion view, require the 
existence of a particular relationship that triggers obligations of distributive justice. On first 
glance, such a relationship seems difficult to establish regarding future people, especially in 
regard to generations that will live hundreds of years from now. So, humanity-based views 
seem to include future generations more easily into the scope of justice than interactional 
views. The absence of direct reciprocity is particularly challenging for theories that rely 
heavily on mutual advantage, such as the co-operation view.68 So, similarly to the global 
domain, different grounds of justice can lead to different conclusions about the scope of 
justice in the intergenerational domain. Just as we could divide the conclusions on the scope 
of justice on the spatial axis in the categories statist and cosmopolitan, we can divide the 
conclusions on the scope of justice on the temporal axis in the categories generationalist and 
chronopolitan.69 Similarly to the statist position that the scope of distributive justice is limited 
in space, namely that it is confined within the borders of the state, generationalists hold that 
the scope of distributive justice is limited in time, namely that it only applies to one or a few 
generations. In contrast, chronopolitans appeal to the equal moral standing of persons and the 
arbitrariness of the time in which someone is born, just like cosmopolitans appeal to the 
arbitrariness of the place where someone is born.70 In the remainder of this chapter, I will 
investigate whether coercion theory could support a chronopolitan standpoint, starting with 
Blake and Nagel’s account of this theory. 
 
3.2 The starting point: requirements for justice-triggering coercion 
 
To assess the implications of the coercion view for the intergenerational domain, I will 
present a framework that captures the set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
existence of a justice-triggering coercive relationship, according to Blake and Nagel. It 
contains four steps: (1) is the act coercive, (2) is it necessary to protect autonomy, (3) can it be 
 
66 Gosseries and Meyer 2009, p. 3. 
67 Meijers 2018. See also: Meyer 2016, par. 3.1. 
68 Gosseries and Meyer 2009, p. 3. 
69 See: Gosseries 2014 and Vrousalis 2016. 
70 See Vrousalis 2016. 
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justified through principles of distributive justice and 
(4) is there a special involvement of the will? The first 
three steps are mainly derived from Blake’s texts on 
coercion theory, since he provides a more 
comprehensive account of the concept ‘coercion’ and 
more tools for applying coercion theory to the 
intergenerational realm. I will assume that Nagel also 
supports these steps. The fourth step incorporates 
Nagel’s authorship requirement. Now, I will explain 
this framework in more detail. 
 
Step one of the framework determines whether an act 
is ‘coercive’ according to Blake’s interpretation of the 
concept. Unfortunately, Blake does not provide a full 
account of coercion, but one passage comes close to a 
definition: “Coercion is an intentional action, 
designed to replace the chosen option with the choice 
of another.”71 From this ‘definition’ and from other 
parts of his work, I have deduced four requirements 
for coercion. Firstly, there must be an action, 
performed by a certain agent.72 Both Nagel and Blake 
are practically exclusively concerned with agents that 
are institutionally embedded. The focus is on the 
institutions of the state, but Blake also mentions the 
possibility that the rules of the WTO are coercive. 
Secondly, the action must be intentional. Given 
Blake’s use of the phrases ‘a conscious human attempt to manipulate’ and ‘deliberate 
agency’, he seems to support a strict interpretation of the concept intention. Under this 
interpretation, not only the action itself must be intentional, but also its coercive effect.73 
Thirdly, the action must manipulate the available options of another agent. What remains 
unclear in Blake and Nagel’s accounts is whether only the manipulation of options through 
coercive threats can be coercive, or also actions that directly limit someone’s options, without 
a preceding threat. I will discuss this issue more extensively in the next paragraph. Fourthly, 
the action does not result from voluntary entrance into an association. To illustrate: if a person 
joins a tennis club and is then expected to abide by the club rules, this is not coercive, since 
they voluntarily joined the association. If these four requirements are fulfilled, an action or 
institution can be considered to be coercive and prima facie incompatible with autonomy. 
 
 
71 Blake 2001, p. 272. 
72 Blake does not mention the word ‘agent’ in his definition, but I will follow Valentini in her standpoint that an 
agent is required by the standard, ‘narrow’ view of coercion, such as Blake and Nagel’s. Valentini 2011, p. 209. 
73 Blake 2001, p. 270. 
18 
 
While coercion is a necessary condition for obligations of justice to arise, it is not a sufficient 
condition, according to Blake. Step two contains an additional necessary condition: that the 
coercive mechanism is necessary for the protection of the autonomy of the coercee.74 
 
One might object that this ‘necessity-condition’ is only relevant for justifying coercion and 
not for triggering obligations of justice. In this view, coercion is a sufficient condition for 
triggering obligations of justice. Whether the coercion is required to protect autonomy only 
plays a role in determining if it is justified. I will argue that this view is incorrect. My 
argument is that Blake denies that obligations of justice are triggered internationally, even 
when he does consider certain international relations coercive. He acknowledges that 
powerful states coerce weaker states, but denies that obligations of justice are triggered.75 This 
shows that coercion alone is not a sufficient condition to trigger obligations of justice. 
 
According to Blake, principles of distributive justice only become relevant when the coercive 
mechanism in question is in some form necessary for the autonomous functioning of those 
coerced.76 So, the ‘necessity-requirement’ is an additional necessary condition for triggering 
obligations of justice. Note the emphasis on ‘in some form’. Blake does not require that the 
specific implementation of a coercive mechanism serves individual autonomy. Take state 
coercion as an example. Blake claims that state coercion triggers obligations of justice since 
he believes that some form of political coercion is necessary for autonomy. However, not all 
acts of political coercion serve autonomy. For example, the way a dictator exercises political 
coercion undermines autonomy. Yet, Blake would disagree that a dictator lacks obligations of 
justice to his subjects, just because he wrongly coerces them. So, the condition cannot be that 
the specific way in which the coercive mechanism is used determines whether obligations of 
justice are triggered. If that were true, the dictator would fail to satisfy the criterion and would 
not have any obligations of justice. Instead, the ‘necessity-requirement’ is satisfied when the 
coercive act in question is the implementation of a coercive mechanism that is in some form 
necessary for autonomous functioning, regardless of whether the specific implementation is 
justified or not. 
 
Step three adds two requirements, which determine whether the introduction of principles of 
distributive justice would serve to justify the coercive mechanism in question. That is the case 
when the coercion creates a pattern of entitlements and is directed against individuals. The 
former requirement is meant to connect coercion to distribution77 and the latter is important 
because principles of justice are meant to justify coercion against individuals.78 In this step 
too, as with the second step, the triggering-question is interrelated with the justifying-
question. Only if principles of distributive justice can play some role in justifying the type of 
coercion in question, principles of distributive justice can be triggered. 
 
74 Note that the term ‘necessity’ is not used here as ‘logically necessary’, but as required for a certain purpose 
(namely the protection of autonomy). 
75 Blake 2011, p. 557. 
76 Blake 2001, p. 265. 
77 Blake 2011, p. 566. 
78 Blake 2011, p. 568. 
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The inclusion of Nagel’s account adds a fourth step to the framework. He demands that the 
coerced individuals are also (partial) authors of the coercion. That requires “a special 
involvement of agency or the will that is inseparable from membership of a political 
society”.79 This special involvement of the will is rather abstract and Nagel specifies it in 
various ways. Relevant is whether the coerced individual is made responsible for the coercive 
system because it is imposed in her name, whether it is intended to serve her interest and 
whether she is expected to accept and uphold the rules of the system. In paragraph 3.4, I will 
argue that different interpretations of this requirement lead to different implications of 
Nagel’s theory in the intergenerational realm. While it cannot be excluded that Blake also 
cares about mutual coercion, it does not follow from his work that he requires coercion to be 
mutual in the same way Nagel does. So, Blake only needs to show that step 1-3 are satisfied, 
while Nagel additionally needs to satisfy step 4. 
 
Before we continue, I must clarify that my discussion will focus on the obligations that 
present generations might have to future people that do not overlap with them. Since all 
citizens of a state alive at a certain moment are subjected to the same coercive institutions, 
overlapping generations fall within the scope of justice as specified by coercion theory, 
regardless of their age group. The question is whether coercion theory also applies beyond the 
overlap. 
 
3.3 General obstacles for coercing the future 
 
In this paragraph, I will briefly discuss two general obstacles for coercing the future. The first 
obstacle concerns the fact that future people do not exist yet and the second obstacle arises 
from the commonly accepted idea that coercion must take place through threats. 
 
Firstly, let us abstract from actual behaviors and briefly discuss if it is theoretically possible 
for present generations to coerce future people, given that future generations do not exist yet. 
The concept of coercion roughly requires that one agent coerces another agent into either 
performing a certain action or refraining from performing an action. Intergenerational 
coercion would mean that an agent who lives currently coerces an agent who will live in the 
future. When it comes to coercion, we are concerned with both the action of the coercer and 
the consequences to the person who is coerced. In the case of intergenerational coercion, these 
actions find place during different times. That makes it difficult to say when the coercion 
takes place: in the present or in the future.  
 
Other questions are whether it is possible to coerce someone who is not born yet and whether 
it is possible to coerce someone whose existence depends on the coercive act in question. In 
other words: is it possible to coerce possible people? These two questions are variations to the 
non-existence challenge and the non-identity challenge. I will not elaborate on them further. I 
will only briefly consider Axel Gosseries’ response to the problem of harming future people: 
 
79 Nagel 2005, p. 128. 
20 
 
the idea of future-rights-of-future-people.80 This idea depends on three propositions: (1) that it 
is possible to have current obligations in relation to a right that will exist in the future, (2) that 
there is a significant probability that there will be people in the future and (3) that they will 
have rights then. When we accept these, it is irrelevant that future people cannot be harmed 
today by our current actions. The fact that they could be harmed in the future, as a 
consequence of our current actions, suffices. Analogously, the claim can be made that it does 
not matter that future people cannot be coerced today. It suffices that our actions now are 
likely to manipulate their options in the future, in a way that can be characterized as coercion. 
To summarize: the problem of coercing future people is very similar to the problem of 
harming future people. So, coercing people who do not exist yet is only possible when a 
solution to the problem of harming future people can be found. In what follows, I will assume 
a solution can be found. 
 
Secondly, the possibility of coercing future generations through our actions today depends on 
one’s interpretation of the concept of coercion. The prevalent accounts of coercion 
exclusively associate coercion with reciprocal threats that successfully alter the will of the 
coercee. This view on coercion became leading after Robert Nozick published an influential 
essay on coercion.81 Before Nozick’s essay, it was common to include the use of direct 
influence in the concept of coercion.82  
 
Nozick’s account excludes direct uses of force or violence as instances of coercion and 
associates coercion only with threats that influence the coercee’s course of action.83 This 
conception of coercion requires reciprocal communication between the coercer and the 
potential subject of the coercion. The threat is communicated by the coercer to the subject and 
whether this threat is in fact coercive depends on the reaction of the subject. The threat is 
coercive when the subject changes her action in response to the threat: when she takes a 
certain action or abstains from it, because she wants to avoid the negative consequence of not 
abiding by the threat. The kind of reciprocal communication that this conception of coercion 
demands is not possible in the intergenerational realm. We cannot make some consequence 
dependent on whether future generations do or do not perform a certain action, because they 
do not exist yet and consequentially cannot act yet. When they do live and can act in the 
future, we will not be there anymore to administer the consequences for not abiding by our 
threat.84 Additionally, we run into an epistemological problem. Whether something counts as 
coercion under Nozick’s conception, depends on the reaction of the (potential) subject of the 
coercion. Only ‘successful’ coercion counts as coercion, but we cannot know that before the 
subject is born and can act. That would mean we can never say our actions now are 
intergenerationally coercive. And according to coercion theory, if coercion cannot be 
established, obligations of justice cannot be established. So, the lack of reciprocity between 
 
80 Gosseries 2008b, p. 455-458. 
81 Nozick 1969. 
82 Anderson 2017, par. 1.4. 
83 Anderson 2017, par. 2.1. 
84 Perhaps it would be possible to invent mechanisms that could make this possible in the future, but in this thesis 
I am concerned with whether present generations currently engage in coercive acts regarding future people. 
21 
 
present and future generations makes this conception of coercion unsuitable for the 
intergenerational domain. 
 
This teaches us two important prerequisites for coercion to function intergenerationally. We 
need a conception of coercion that depends only on the actions of the coercer and does not 
require reciprocity. Such a conception must allow for direct manipulation of options to be 
coercive, in addition to threats. In this view of coercion,  “an agent X can coerce another Y by 
eliminating certain options for Y or by imposing restrictions the avoidance of which would 
require significant cost of Y.”85 
 
It is not clear whether Nagel and Blake exclude direct force from the concept of coercion. On 
the one hand, both authors do focus on coercion through the legal system of the state. The 
coerciveness of this system is characterized by the fact that many of its rules are backed up by 
the threat of force.86 On the other hand, that does not necessarily mean they exclude coercion 
by direct force. Blake seems to admit that the rules of the WTO are coercive since states do 
not have a real alternative but to join the WTO. There are no threats involved with not joining 
the WTO. The WTO will not punish states who decide against joining. It is simply very costly 
not to join. Additionally, Blake’s focus on autonomy suggests that direct force might also be 
an element in the set of necessary and sufficient conditions for coercion, since surely direct 
force can also effectively manipulate the options of an agent to live an autonomous life. In 
any case, the project of establishing intergenerational coercion can only be successful under 
the assumption that coercion can take place through the direct elimination of options, in 
addition to threats. In the remainder of this chapter I will use this interpretation as the core of 
the concept of (intergenerational) coercion: present generations coerce future generations to 
either act or not act in certain ways if, and only if, their actions limit future generations’ 
options. 
 
I will now discuss the three options for intergenerational coercion: coercion through legal, 
environmental and financial mechanisms. For each option, I will first explain how present 
generations use the mechanism to limit the options of future generations. Then I will walk 
through step one, two and four of the framework from paragraph 3.2 and discuss under which 
assumptions the use of this mechanism creates a justice-triggering coercive relationship. I will 
leave out step three, because I do not see any difficulties with this step and it is less important 
for my inquiry. 
 
3.4 Legal Coercion 
 
The first option for establishing a justice-triggering coercive relationship between present and 
future generations is coercion through legal means. Ordinary law is not intergenerationally 
coercive, because any generation can change it through simple majority voting. Therefore, I 
will focus on rigid constitutions. First, I will substantiate that constitutions could be 
 
85 Harb 2014, p. 313.  
86 But, as Hart (1961) famously points out, not all. 
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intergenerationally coercive since they limit generational sovereignty. Then I will walk 
through the steps of the framework from paragraph 3.2, to investigate if Nagel and Blake’s 
requirements for justice-triggering coercion are met. During this investigation we will see that 
certain assumptions must be made about the right conceptualization of the concept of coercion 
to successfully establish a coercive intergenerational relationship based on legal coercion. 
Additionally, I will argue that the success of this option depends on certain characteristics of 
the specific constitutions, such as the content and who the founding generation is. 
 
Constitutional rigidity: limiting generational sovereignty 
The clearest example of a legal instrument with intergenerational effects is a constitution. 
Constitutions establish the basic institutions of government and contain the fundamental 
principles of a society. As a general rule, constitutions are meant to govern a society for many 
generations. Typically, special amendment rules make constitutions more difficult to modify 
than ordinary laws. Those constitutions are called ‘rigid’.87  
 
Thomas Jefferson has famously objected to ‘perpetual constitutions’, which are meant to 
govern a society indefinitely, by declaring that “the earth belongs in usufruct to the living”.88 
He argued that the self-determination of a generation is impeded by a constitution that lasts 
after the founding generation is no longer the majority of the population. Generations should 
be able to choose for themselves the principles by which they wish to run their society. 
Therefore, he proposed that all laws, including constitutions, should expire automatically after 
two decades. Jefferson’s standpoint is radical, since he considers not only rigid constitutions, 
but all perpetual constitutions and laws illegitimate.  
 
While it is correct that all perpetual laws shape the options of future generations in some way, 
only rigid constitutions can be coercive. These constitutions are intentionally designed by 
their founders to be difficult to amend. Where non-rigid laws can be altered according to 
simple majority decision-making, rigid constitutions impose additional constraints on the 
population for altering their content. Thereby, they impede generational sovereignty. After all, 
what is most problematic about coercion according to Blake, is that it undermines autonomy 
because it “reduces the will of one person to the will of another”.89 Literature supports the 
position that constitutional rigidity can have this undermining effect. According to González-
Ricoy “constitutions can end up imposing the will of the founding generation on subsequent 
generations, hence undermining future generations’ sovereignty.”90 Gosseries agrees that 
rigid constitutions may limit the options of generations to decide the fundamental rules of 
their society for themselves.91 Therefore, I will focus on rigid constitutions in this paragraph.  
 
 
 
 
87 Gosseries 2014, p. 528. 
88 Jefferson 1975, p. 445. 
89 Blake 2001, p. 268. 
90 Gonzáles-Ricoy 2016, p. 40. 
91 Gosseries 2008b, p. 32. 
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Step one: Is constitutional rigidity coercive? 
The question I will address now, is whether this impediment to generational sovereignty is 
actually coercive of future people. I will argue here that this depends on two factors: firstly on 
how rigid the constitution is and secondly on the content of the constitution. A constitution 
can only be coercive when it is rigid to an extent that it leaves no reasonable options to the 
generations that inherit it than to keep it, and when the content of the constitution is such that 
it limits individual autonomy. 
 
Rigid constitutional provisions complicate a generation’s options to shape the constitution 
according to their own ideas. Is this way of altering the choice structure already coercive? It is 
useful here to distinguish between voluntary choices on the one hand and coerced choices on 
the other hand. A choice is voluntary when reasonable alternatives are available and a choice 
is coerced when no reasonable alternatives are available.92 This means that imposing a choice 
structure on future generations by imposing a rigid constitution on them is not definitely 
coercive. The choice of a generation to keep the constitution they inherited unchanged is only 
coerced when there are no reasonable alternatives. 
 
I will illustrate this argument with an example. Imagine I am walking towards a crossroads 
where I can go left or right. On the left, it is very busy with people. So busy in fact that it 
would take quite some effort for me to get through. Am I now coerced into taking a right? I 
do not think so. Although the crowd makes it more difficult for me to go left, making the 
effort to get through is still a reasonable alternative to going right. Now let me change the 
situation. Instead of a group of people, there is a sole witch standing on the left. She says she 
will allow me to go through, but only in exchange of my first-born child. In this case, I am 
coerced into going right, since the witch’s condition leaves me with no reasonable alternative 
to going right. 
 
Looking at it this way, it is important to take into account how rigid a constitution is. There is 
an important difference between a constitution that contains only a few provisions whose 
amendment requires a modest supermajority (say 60%) and a constitution that is legally non-
revisable. A constitution is only coercive, when there is no reasonable alternative to abiding 
by it. So, rigid amendment procedures are not coercive when they leave open reasonable 
options for revision. One might even doubt if ‘non-revisable’ constitutions are coercive. After 
all, if a generation really wants to get rid of the constitution they inherited, they can 
theoretically ignore the non-revisability and adopt a brand-new constitution. What should we 
think of this possibility? The crucial question here is not whether it is theoretically possible to 
avoid coercion, but if this can be done at no extremely high cost. In other words: is adopting a 
new constitution a reasonable option?  In some cases, a constitutional shift (outside of the 
amendment rules) might go smoothly. Yet, in other cases a constitutional revolution can lead 
to a massive lack in legal certainty and possibly a state of nature like situation. If such a 
constitutional revolution would seriously destabilize the functioning of the society, that would 
definitely undermine the ability of citizens to autonomously pursue the projects they deem 
 
92 Following Olsaretti 2016. 
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important in their conception of the good. In those cases, adopting a new constitution would 
not be a reasonable option. Only where a constitutional shift is not a reasonable option, can a 
constitution be coercive. 
 
Not only the rigidness of a constitution is relevant, but also its content. Remember that Blake 
is primarily concerned with coercion because it limits individual autonomy. He argued that 
criminal and civil law limit the options for individuals to live autonomous lives; criminal law 
because it is backed by the sanction of incarceration and civil law because it regulates 
ownership of property and income. In contrast, the impact of constitutions on individual 
autonomy seems to be primarily positive. Typically, constitutions contain a number of basic 
rights and liberties, that protect the individual from interference by the state. So while a rigid 
constitution may impede collective sovereignty, I doubt whether it seriously limits individual 
autonomy.  
 
One possibility to avoid this obstacle is to argue that the legal system as a whole is 
intergenerationally coercive. As we have already seen, the system of law is coercive 
according to Blake and Nagel. Yet, it is questionable if this is intergenerational coercion. 
Ordinary law is usually not rigid. Provisions that can be amended by a simple majority cannot 
be said to constrain the options of future generations to make their own rules as much as rigid 
provisions. If a generation that inherits a system of law from the previous generation decides 
not to change it, it does not seem to be the previous generation that coerces them by enforcing 
these laws, but the present generation itself. So, this response will not work. 
 
A more promising response is to acknowledge that not all constitutions contain an extensive 
catalogue of civil rights and liberties. In authoritarian regimes, constitutions do not protect but 
endanger individual autonomy.93 For instance, by establishing the primacy of a certain 
religion, the freedom to choose one’s own religion is undermined. If such constitutions are 
rigid, they might undermine not only current generations’ autonomy, but future people’s 
autonomy too. This response suggests that there is an important distinction between, roughly 
divided, ‘liberal’ and ‘authoritarian’ constitutions. While the former protect individual 
autonomy, the latter could seriously undermine it. So, all other things equal, authoritarian 
constitutions are more likely to be intergenerationally coercive than liberal constitutions. 
 
To summarize, legal provisions can only coerce when they are rigid to such an extent that 
they leave no reasonable options for amendment. Additionally, the content of the constitution 
must be such that it undermines individual autonomy. 
 
Step two: Is constitutional rigidity necessary for individual autonomy? 
Step two requires that the coercive mechanism is in some form required for the protection of 
the coercee’s autonomy. I will argue here that this requirement can be satisfied. Some form of 
constitutional rigidity is required to protect the autonomy of future people. The strongest 
reason for this is the unequal power relation between present and future people.  
 
93 E.g. Tremmel 2017, esp. p. 7-8. 
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Firstly, there is a good case that at least some rigid constitutional provisions are desirable at a 
given time. We call this intragenerational rigidity.94 Constitutional provisions regarding 
fundamental rights and liberties are made difficult to change to protect individuals against the 
interference of others and tyranny of the majority. The same argument applies to institutional 
provisions, such as a democratic election process and the separation of powers. These 
provisions are meant to keep state power within bounds and protect the private sphere in 
which individuals can determine their own way of life. However, this does not yet establish 
that intergenerational rigidity, rigidity across generations, is also desirable. Two arguments 
can be given in favor of intergenerational rigidity. 
 
The first argument is practical. Gosseries argues that intergenerational rigidity might be an 
unavoidable side-effect of intragenerational rigidity, because generations always overlap.95 
This overlap makes it practically unavoidable that a rigid constitution that subjects one 
generation also subjects any generation that overlaps with the first. Trying to avoid this gives 
rise to multiple infeasible scenario’s, such as different overlapping generations being subject 
to different constitutions at the same time. 
 
The second argument is more principled. Provisions in a constitution may be directly intended 
to protect the interests of future generations.96 Intergenerational rigidity protects the 
effectiveness of these provisions and thereby protects the autonomy of future generations. 
One might argue, for instance, that a provision that protects sustainability must be rigid to 
prevent current or intermittent generations from acting in their short-term self-interest and 
thereby endangering the autonomy of their successors. Future generations are subject to the 
power of present generations and need to be protected against this. A provision protecting the 
right of future generations to clean air will not be effective when current generations can 
easily abolish it when they want to increase their own consumption. Intergenerational rigidity 
is necessary for such provisions because changes by intermittent generations can impede their 
intended effect in the long run.97 
 
Note that it depends on the content of a constitution whether the autonomy of future 
generations is actually protected. Many current constitutions do not contain provisions for the 
protection of future generation’s interests. However, the question here is not whether the 
specific implementation of the coercive mechanism (here constitutional rigidity) actually 
protects autonomy, but whether the coercive mechanism is in some form required for the 
protection autonomy. While the former depends on the content of the constitution, the latter 
does not. The former question relates to the justification-question98 and the latter to the 
triggering-question. To conclude, the requirement of step two is satisfied. Some form of 
 
94 Gosseries 2008, p. 33. 
95 Gosseries 2008, p. 33. 
96 See: González-Ricoy 2016, p. 42-43. 
97 González-Ricoy 2016, p. 42. 
98 For example, provisions that undermine individual autonomy cannot be justified. They should not be in the 
constitution, let alone be difficult to change. 
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intergenerational constitutional rigidity is necessary to robustly protect the individual 
autonomy of future generations against the unequal power that present generations have over 
them. 
 
Step four: Constitutional rigidity and special involvement of the will 
The fourth step of the framework is Nagel’s authorship criterion. This criterion entails that 
obligations of justice are only owed to those whose will is involved in the coercion. It aims to 
distinguish between foreigners, who are ‘only’ subject to coercive acts of a state, and citizens, 
whose will is involved in state coercion. To satisfy Nagel’s authorship requirement, we need 
to show that the will of future generations is involved in constitutional coercion. I will 
distinguish two interpretations of this requirement: an active and a passive interpretation. I 
will argue that it is only possible to satisfy the requirement when we assume that the passive 
interpretation is correct.  
 
The active interpretation of the authorship criterion requires action or contribution of the 
coercee that makes them a (partial) author of this coercion. In the common use of the words, 
both ‘authorship’ and ‘will’ require something of the person who is said to be the author of 
something, or who wills something. People who do not live yet cannot be authors or have a 
will in this way. They cannot be made responsible for government action which is taken 
before they are born because of any action undertaken by them. They cannot vote, contribute 
to public discourse or accept or reject the way in which the government acts. They cannot 
even tacitly consent to state coercion by participating in the system. Consequentially, they 
also cannot make up their mind about something, cannot ‘will’ anything. So, since future 
generations cannot act or contribute yet, this interpretation of Nagel’s criterion excludes 
future generations from the scope of justice. 
 
The passive interpretation of the authorship criterion focuses not on the actions of the 
coercees, but on the intent of the coercer. In this interpretation, obligations of justice are owed 
to those individuals in whose name and interest state coercion takes place. This interpretation 
also excludes foreigners, because the state acts in the name and interests of its citizens and not 
those who live across the state’s borders. However, it leaves more room for the inclusion of 
future generations, because the intentions of the coercer are decisive, not the actions of the 
coercee. 
 
If we assume that the passive interpretation is correct, the question remains whether states 
implement legally coercive institutions in the name and interest of future people. If so, then 
the requirement is satisfied. But if not, then according to Nagel’s account of coercion, the 
state does not owe future people a special justification in the form of principles of distributive 
justice. Harb suggests that whether this requirement is satisfied depends on the specific 
constitutions of states.99 Decisive is whether a constitution contains a provision which 
prescribes that the rights or interests of future generations must be taken into account. The 
large majority of existing constitutions does not contain provisions about future 
 
99 Harb 2014, p. 317. 
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generations.100 If only constitutions that contain a provision about future generations can 
satisfy Nagel’s authorship requirement, then the future generations of this majority of states 
would be excluded from the scope of justice.  
 
I agree with Harb that whether the interests of future generations are served is a factual 
question on Nagel’s account, not a normative one. However, it is not necessary that a 
constitution explicitly includes a concern for future generations. Illustrative is Nagel’s 
elaboration of the position of the inhabitants of colonies. He includes them in the scope of 
justice and notes that what it means for a society to be governed in the name of its members 
must be broadly interpreted in this case.101 Surely not many states have ever included 
provisions in their constitutions to protect the inhabitants of their colonies. Still, Nagel 
includes them in the group of people whose interests are supposed to be served with state 
coercion. This supports my view that states do not have to explicate that they also serve the 
interests of future generations.  
 
If we cannot find the answer to whether the authorship-criterion is satisfied in states’ 
constitutions, then how do we know if constitutional coercion finds place in the name and 
interest of future generations? We cannot answer this question on the basis of Nagel’s text. 
Nagel seems to assume that a state always intends to serve the interests of its members. He 
does not give any additional criteria for when this is the case. What we can do, is look at 
another factor that Nagel deems relevant for the authorship criterion: acceptance. He mentions 
that the will of the citizens of the state (and the inhabitants of colonies) is involved in the 
system of state coercion because they are expected to accept and uphold the system. This 
criterion does seem to apply to future citizens, especially in regard to the constitution. Most 
constitutions are intended to govern a society for many generations and future generations are 
expected to uphold it during their lifetime. Thus, their acceptance of the coercive system is 
demanded. 
 
In conclusion, only when we assume that the passive interpretation of Nagel’s authorship-
criterion is correct, there is room for including future citizens in the scope of justice. Under 
this interpretation, the intent of the coercer is decisive. A workable account of 
intergenerational coercion cannot depend on any actions of the coercee, since future 
generations cannot act yet. Still, the criterion is only fulfilled when we also assume that legal 
coercion does indeed take place in the name and the interest of future generations and that 
their acceptance of the constitution is demanded. 
 
Who owes obligations of justice? 
Finally, I want to address that legal coercion through constitutional rigidity seems to exclude 
any generation except for the founding generation from bearing obligations of justice to future 
generations. Recall that according to coercion theory, obligations of justice arise from a 
coercive relationship. In the case of intergenerational coercion, present generations would 
 
100 See: constituteproject.org. 
101 Nagel 2005, p. 129, footnote 14. 
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owe obligations of justice to future generations when they coerce these future generations. So, 
only the present generations that actually coerce future generations can have these obligations. 
We have seen that the generation that installs a constitution coerces future generations (under 
certain conditions), because this limits the options of these future generations for living 
according to their own plans. Thus, between the founding generation and the succeeding 
generations that inherit the constitution, a coercive justice-triggering relationship may exist. 
However, there are also generations presently alive that have not founded their current 
constitution, but inherited it from their predecessors. Consider the Dutch constitution, which 
was founded in 1814 and assume that this constitution satisfies all the other conditions. 
Present Dutch generations inherited this constitution, they did not found it. Then, if they pass 
the constitution on to future generations, this does not create a coercive relationship between 
them and these future generations. Because of the highly rigid form of the constitution (which 
it must have to conform to the conditions), they did not have a reasonable alternative to 
passing on the constitution. In a way, they are coerced into passing on the constitution. Not 
them, but the founding generation caused the limitations of options for future generations. So, 
only the founding generation has obligations to all generations that succeed it. This is a 
serious limitation to the applicability of obligations of justice and does not seem like an 
intuitively plausible conclusion. 
 
In this paragraph, I have explored the possibility that constitutions could create a coercive 
relationship between present and future generations that triggers obligations of justice. My 
conclusion is that the success of this option depends on the assumption that Nagel’s 
authorship criterion should be interpreted in a passive way. Besides, the success of the option 
is contingent on the specifics of the constitution in question. Present generations can only 
have obligations to future generations because of legal coercion if the constitution is rigid 
enough to leave no other reasonable alternative than abiding by it, and if the content of the 
constitution is such that it limits individual autonomy. Finally, only the founders of a 
constitution can have obligations of justice on the basis of legal coercion. We can conclude 
that in general, present generations do not have obligations on the basis of legal coercion. This 
is (at most) the case for certain specific states. 
 
3.5 Environmental coercion 
 
In this section, I will discuss whether environmental impact by current generations can create 
a coercive relationship between present and future generations. Again, I will walk through the 
steps of the framework from paragraph 3.2. We will see that intergenerational environmental 
coercion can be established when we make certain assumptions about the concept of coercion. 
We need to assume that both the ‘intentionality’ and the ‘agency’ requirement can be given a 
broader interpretation. Additionally, we need to assume that ‘the necessity-requirement’ is not 
a necessary condition for triggering obligations of justice but only for the justification of 
coercion. Finally, Nagel’s authorship requirement needs to be abandoned. I will elaborate on 
these points below. First, I will explain how present generations manipulate the options of 
future generations by impacting their environment. 
 
29 
 
Impacting the environment: manipulation of options 
The activities of current generations impact the natural environment in many ways, including 
the pollution of land, water and air, the depletion of natural resources, particularly farm land, 
fuels, fish and forests and the failure to preserve species of plants and animals, places of 
natural beauty and cultural landmarks.102 Since future generations will inherit the earth in the 
condition we leave it, these actions also impact future generations. The more we deplete 
resources and endanger existing ecosystems, the more difficult it becomes for future 
generations to repair this damage and to use and enjoy their natural environment. Our 
activities, primarily through the emission of greenhouse gasses, are also changing the global 
climate. The probable effects of climate change include an increase in extreme weather, such 
as long-lasting drought, desertification, forest fires, flooding and typhoons, rising sea levels, 
damage to ecosystems, risk of extinction of species, decreased food security, risks to 
economic growth and an increase in poverty.103 These effects of climate change are projected 
to have a severe impact on future generations.  
 
Step one: Is environmental change coercive? 
The way of affecting future generations I described above satisfies one necessary condition 
for coercion: the manipulation of the available options. Resource depletion limits the options 
for using exhaustible natural resources and natural resources that take millennia to replenish, 
such as fossil fuels, fish and forests. Pollution limits the possibilities for using land, water and 
air. Failure to preserve biodiversity and natural scenery limits the options to enjoy natural 
beauty. As for individual autonomy, climate change might seriously threaten access to the 
most basic conditions for living as autonomous agents, such as food security, shelter, access 
to drinking water and health. However, for environmental change to be coercive, we need to 
assume that the ‘intentionality’ and the ‘agency’ requirement can be given a broader 
interpretation. 
 
In my explanation of the assessment framework, I have argued that Blake supports a strict 
interpretation of the intentionality requirement. The coercer must have intended the coercive 
effect of his action. However, the changes in the natural environment that current generations 
are causing, are not deliberately made to manipulate the options of future generations. It is not 
the purpose of these actions to coerce future generations. So, environmental coercion does not 
satisfy the strict interpretation of the intentionality requirement. For environmental coercion 
to be characterized as coercion, we need to relax this requirement. We could replace it with 
the weaker condition that a coercive action is intentional when the coercer knowingly accepts 
the coercive consequences of his action. If we assume that this interpretation is correct, 
environmental coercion does satisfy the intentionality requirement. Present generations know 
the consequences of their actions for the environment of future generations and still persist in 
these actions. 
 
 
102 Hausman, McPherson and Satz 2016, p. 327. 
103 Hoegh-Guldberg e.a. 2018. 
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Secondly, both Blake and Nagel require that there is a clearly identifiable (collective) actor, 
embedded in an institutional framework, which subjects individuals to coercion. In regard to 
climate change, pointing to one or a select few actors who can be held responsible for limiting 
the options of future generations seems impossible. The aggregate contribution of many 
states, businesses and individuals adds up to a destructive total amount of emissions and 
depletion of natural resources. One might object that there are certain actors whose individual 
contribution to the problem is not negligible. Additionally, states may hold a shared 
responsibility for the emissions that they permit. However, this does not affect the conclusion 
that the environmental damage current generations are doing cannot be reduced to the actions 
of one or a few identifiable actors. We cannot point to one ‘coercer’. This problem can be 
solved if we assume that the agency requirement can be broadened and we accept a structural 
or systemic approach. Arguably, environmental coercion could be seen as a form systematic 
coercion, being caused by wide-spread, predictable patterns of human behavior.  
 
Step two: Is environmental change necessary for the protection of autonomy? 
In my explanation of the assessment framework, I have discussed whether the ‘necessity-
requirement’ was only a necessary condition for the justification of coercion or also for 
triggering principles of distributive justice. I argued the latter was correct, with the 
modification that only the coercive mechanism must be necessary for the protection of 
autonomy, and not the specific implementation of the mechanism. However, even with this 
modification, environmental coercion cannot satisfy this requirement. It is not necessary to 
protect the autonomy of those coerced and only infringes on future generations’ autonomy. 
So, as a coercive mechanism, environmental coercion does not satisfy the requirement, 
regardless of the specific implementation. This means that it should not be justified but 
eliminated according to Blake’s coercion theory. To avoid this problem, we need to assume 
that the necessity requirement is not a necessary condition for triggering obligations of justice, 
but only for justifying coercion. Only then could environmental coercion still trigger 
obligations of distributive justice. 
 
Step four: Environmental change and special involvement of the will 
Can the way in which present generations shape the environment of future generations satisfy 
Nagel’s authorship requirement? I cannot see how. Even under the passive interpretation of 
the requirement, the interests of future generations must be served with the coercive system. 
What present generations are doing to the global resources and climate does not serve the 
interests of future generations in any way. It makes no sense to ask whether climate change 
happens in their name or whether their acceptance is demanded. What we are doing to the 
environment is so detrimental to future generations that the only explanation for why we are 
still doing it, is precisely the opposite. We are ignoring their interests and have no regard for 
the acceptability of our actions for future generations. So, to establish a justice-triggering 
coercive relationship between present and future generations on the basis of environmental 
coercion, we need to assume that such a relationship can exist without fulfilling the authorship 
requirement. 
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In conclusion, environmental coercion could trigger obligations of justice, but only when the 
requirements of agency and intentionality are given a broader interpretation than in the 
original framework and when the necessity and authorship requirement are abandoned. 
 
3.6 Financial coercion 
 
In this last section, I will discuss whether financial coercion, more specifically: public debt, 
can establish a coercive relationship between present and future generations. Again, I will 
walk through the framework from paragraph 3.2. First, I will argue that how present 
generations impact the financial means of future generations can satisfy the ‘manipulation of 
options-requirement’ from step one. However, sometimes the debt has so little consequences 
that it is not coercive. Then, we will see that the ‘intentionality’ requirement of step one can 
only be satisfied under a broader interpretation. Also, arguably financial coercion is a 
necessary mechanism to protect future generations’ autonomy. Finally, Nagel’s authorship 
requirement can only be satisfied under the ‘passive’ interpretation. 
 
The debt burden: manipulation of options 
It is common practice for states to finance public expenditure by borrowing money. Thereby, 
a government incurs public debt. When the generation that incurs the debt does not pay it off 
within their lifetime, this debt is inherited by their successors. Economists have argued that 
public debt can place a burden on future generations. When they inherit debt from their 
predecessors, they have to forego part of their own consumption during their lifetime, because 
they have to pay interest and eventually repay the debt.104 Thomas Jefferson was also 
concerned about intergenerational debt.105 He argued that it is wrong to place the debt burden 
caused by the financial decisions of one generation onto the shoulders of future generations.  
 
Intergenerational debt is potentially coercive because it can constrain the spending options of 
future generations. The part of their financial means that is used to retire and pay interest on 
public debts cannot be used for other things they might want or need. Inherited debts may 
limit their ability to finance their own public projects.106 If the debt burden leads to higher 
taxes, individuals have to forego part of their private consumption and are deprived of certain 
options for the pursuit of their life plans. 
 
Step one: Is intergenerational public debt coercive? 
Public debt is potentially coercive, because it can limit the spending options of future 
generations. However, to be able to establish a justice-triggering coercive relationship on the 
basis of financial coercion, we need to broaden the intentionality requirement. Additionally, 
the consequences of public debt are only coercive when they actually limit options. This is not 
always the case. 
 
 
104 Buchanan 1999; Bowen, Davis and Kopf 1960. 
105 Jefferson 1975, p. 445 
106 See: Wolf 2008, p. 13. 
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Just like in the case of environmental coercion, the manipulation of options through public 
debt does not seem to be intentional in the strict sense. Even though the borrowing generation 
intentionally borrows money to finance public spending, it does not do so to deliberately 
manipulate future generations’ options. This problem can be averted if we adopt a slightly 
broader interpretation of intentionality: knowingly accepting the coercive consequences of 
your actions. In this interpretation, financial coercion does satisfy the intentionality 
requirement: present generations know that passing on their debt has financial consequences 
for future generations. 
 
Similarly to the case of legal coercion, whether public debt is actually coercive depends on 
the specifics. While public debt can significantly affect the spending options of future 
generations, this is not always the case. When the debt is quite small, it might have little to no 
effect on the spending options of future generations. Even having to pay interest need not to 
affect their spending options, as long as they can finance these payments by borrowing more 
money. Intergenerational public debt is only coercive of future generations when they have to 
forego pursuing their own projects, because they have to spend the money on inherited public 
debt. Whether that is the case depends not only on the size of the public debt, but also to 
whom the public debt is owed and other factors, such as the financial reputation of the state in 
question.  
 
Step two: Is intergenerational public debt necessary? 
Is financial coercion as a mechanism in some form required for the protection of the 
individual autonomy of future generations? Note that the public spending which is funded by 
public debts can be very beneficial to future generations. It is not always (only) a burden. I 
agree with Madison that while it is unjust to pass on unnecessary burdens to future 
generations, some debts might be incurred “principally for the benefit of posterity”. 107 The 
debt burden can be acceptable when it serves the interests of posterity. For instance, 
investment in clean energy technology might provide future generations with the renewable 
energy sources they need. 
 
However, the fact that public spending funded by debts can benefit future generations does 
not yet establish that shifting the burden to future generations is also necessary. If the 
generation that incurs the debt can pay it off in their own lifetime, transferring it to future 
generations is unnecessary. Passing on debt is only necessary when it would be otherwise 
impossible to reach the goal of protecting future generations’ autonomy. However, it is 
plausible that at least in some cases, the amount of money that needs to be borrowed in the 
interest of future generations is too large for the borrowing generation to pay off within their 
own lifetime. This could be the case with measures against climate change. If these cases 
exist, public debt satisfies the necessity-requirement. 
 
 
 
 
107 Madison 1992, p. 25. 
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Step four: Financial coercion and special involvement of the will 
Just like in the case of constitutional rigidity, satisfying Nagel’s authorship-criterion is only 
possible when it is interpreted in an indirect and passive way. In this interpretation, the 
transfer of those public debts that are incurred (at least partly) for the protection of the 
autonomy of future generations could satisfy the authorship-criterion. Those debts seem to 
serve the interests of future generations. Their acceptance is also demanded, since they are 
supposed to pay interest and eventually repay the debts.  
 
In conclusion, financial coercion could trigger obligations of justice, but only when the 
intentionality-requirement and the authorship-requirement are given a broader interpretation 
than in the original framework. If we accept these assumptions, then public debts that 
constrain future generations’ options for pursuing their own plans can trigger obligations of 
justice. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have looked for ways to establish a coercive justice-triggering relationship 
between present and future generations. To conclude, I will summarize the most important 
findings. 
 
As a starting point, I have constructed a framework with the requirements for justice-
triggering coercion that follow from Blake and Nagel’s coercion theory. When I applied this 
framework to three options for intergenerational coercion, I ran into various obstacles, where 
the options did not seem to conform to the framework as I set it out. Where obstacles arose, I 
suggested how coercion theorists could respond to still be able to establish justice-triggering 
intergenerational coercion. Sometimes that meant that a requirement needed to be interpreted 
in a broader way than in the original framework and sometimes it meant abandoning a 
requirement altogether, assuming that it was not relevant for the question what triggers 
obligations of justice after all. Through this process, we have gotten an idea what an account 
of coercion must look like to be applicable to present generations’ relationship with future 
generations. 
 
Most importantly, an intergenerationally applicable notion of coercion would have to deviate 
from the commonly accepted notion of coercion: altering the subject’s will through reciprocal 
threats. Instead, the core of coercion would need to be the direct limitation of options. By 
limiting their options, present generations restrict future generations’ autonomy. The actions 
of the coercer are central in this notion of coercion. There is coercion when present 
generations use the power that they have over future generations because of the 
unidirectionality of time to restrict future generations’ options. Intergenerationally, the 
coerciveness of an action cannot depend on the reaction of the coercee, because future 
generations cannot act yet. Therefore, a coercee-focused notion of coercion would make us 
unable to know whether an act is coercive. 
 
To establish a justice-triggering relationship on the basis of coercion through legal, 
environmental and financial mechanisms, we need to make some assumptions. For the option 
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of legal coercion to succeed, we need to interpret the authorship-requirement in a more 
passive way. This is also required for the success of financial coercion. Additionally, the 
intentionality-requirement would have to be broadened for this option to succeed. The point 
about intentionality applies to environmental coercion also. Besides, for this option to 
succeed, the agency requirement needs to be broadened and the necessity and authorship-
requirement need to be abandoned. In the next chapter, I will assess the plausibility of these 
assumptions. 
 
Finally, whether constitutional rigidity and public debt are coercive depends on the specific 
features of the constitutions and public debts in question. So, while legal and financial 
mechanisms could create a coercive relationship between present and future generations of 
some states, it cannot be said in general that present generations have obligations of justice to 
future generations on the basis of legal or financial coercion. 
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Chapter 4: The intergenerational coercion account; plausible? 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I used Blake and Nagel’s accounts of coercion theory to investigate if 
establishing a justice-triggering coercive relationship between present and future generations 
is possible. To avoid obstacles that arose in establishing this coercive relationship, I have 
made certain assumptions In this chapter, I will assess the plausibility of these assumptions. I 
will argue that the (as I will call it) ‘intergenerational coercion account’ is plausible when we 
take the effect on freedom as the core of coercion. In this view, what connects coercion to 
justice is that it restricts freedom and therefore requires justification. This focus on freedom 
allows for a broader definition of coercion than is commonly used. Additionally, I will point 
out that accepting this broader conception of coercion has spill-over effects to global justice. 
Broadening the conception of coercion to establish a coercive relationship between present 
and future generations makes it more plausible that there is a coercive relationship between 
compatriots and non-compatriots too. 
 
4.1 Assessing plausibility 
 
Theorists disagree about the correct conceptualization of coercion. Some accounts of coercion 
focus on the coercer, some on the coercee, some hold that offers can also be coercive and 
others do not. Everyone agrees upon certain paradigmatic cases of coercion, such as robbery. 
Yet, a large grey area exists beyond those cases. According to Laura Valentini, coercion is an 
“essentially contested concept”.108 These are “concepts the proper use of which inevitably 
involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users.”109 On the one 
hand, that means it is difficult to determine whether the ‘intergenerational coercion account’ 
is plausible. There will always be people who disagree. On the other hand, it means that 
different conceptualizations of coercion are possible, perhaps also the intergenerational 
account of coercion. This account cannot be dismissed simply because it is different from 
other specifications of the concept. 
 
In this section, I will discuss four assumptions I made about justice-triggering coercion. 
Firstly, I will argue that it is plausible that coercion can take place by directly limiting 
options, additionally to threats, because both methods of influence limit freedom (or 
autonomy). Next, I will argue that this focus on freedom also makes broadening the 
intentionality and agency requirement plausible. Finally, I will argue that abandoning Nagel’s 
authorship criterion and Blake’s necessity requirement is plausible, because especially in 
cases of pure coercion and unnecessary coercion, we need principles of justice. 
 
Direct limitation of options 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Nozick’s popular conception of coercion does not work in 
the intergenerational realm. Successful reciprocal threats are not possible since present and 
 
108 Valentini 2011, p. 210 
109 Gallie 1956, p. 169. 
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future generations cannot communicate with each other. This is the reason why, in the 
previous chapter, we assumed that coercion could also take place through the direct 
manipulation of options. Here, I will discuss whether this assumption is plausible.  
 
Crucial to the concept of coercion seems to be its effect on freedom. An action can only be 
coercive when it makes the subject less free than they would have been (or in a moralized 
conception; ought to be). The reason for Blake’s concern with coercion is that it limits 
autonomy. Autonomy can be regarded as a specific type of freedom, namely the freedom to 
pursue your own life goals. Both threats and the direct elimination of options can be used to 
make sure that somebody refrains from taking certain actions, thereby constraining freedom. 
Scott Anderson defends the standpoint that not only pressure on the will through threats, but 
also the direct limitation of options can be coercive. He calls this the ‘enforcement approach’, 
which “regards coercion as a kind of activity by a powerful agent who creates and then 
utilizes a significant disparity in power over another in order to constrain or alter the latter’s 
possibilities for action”.110 This focus on power relations fits the relationship between present 
and future generations well. Present generations can exercise power over future generations, 
while future generations can do nothing in return. I do not have the space here to argue for the 
validity of the enforcement approach and will limit myself to pointing out that this approach 
has been defended before.111 So, the idea that the direct manipulation of options can be 
characterized as coercion is not new, although it does depart from Nozick’s popular account 
of coercion. 
 
Instead, I will turn to the question whether the ways in which present generations manipulate 
the options of future generations actually are coercive under the enforcement approach. The 
paradigmatic cases of coercion under this approach are examples of physical constraint, like 
manhandling and imprisonment.112 They are uses of force and violence. The instances of 
environmental, legal and financial coercion are less invasive and more indirect. While they 
limit certain courses of action, they often leave open many other possibilities. The crucial 
question here is how much impact the limiting mechanism must have to be considered 
coercive.  
 
Different standards are proposed. According to Anderson, X coerces Y if and only if X 
substantially constrains Y’s practical possibilities.113 Philippe van Parijs claims that X coerces 
Y if and only if X places constraints on Y, by which Y’s life prospects are significantly 
affected.114 Valentini employs a weaker standard and argues that X coerces Y if and only if X 
places nontrivial constraints on the freedom of Y.115 While the constraints on freedom through 
environmental, legal and financial intergenerational coercion are usually nontrivial, it is more 
difficult to say whether they have a significant or substantial impact on future generations’ 
 
110 Anderson 2010, p. 1. 
111 Before Nozick’s view became popular, the enforcement view was the mainstream view. See Anderson 2017, 
par. 2.3. 
112 Anderson 2010, p. 6. 
113 Anderson 2010, p. 8. 
114 Van Parijs 2007, p. 48. 
115 Valentini 2011, p. 211. 
37 
 
possibilities. It is important to note that environmental, legal and financial intergenerational 
coercion can come in many different degrees. Some instances of legal and financial restraints 
might have significant impact on the lives of future generations and some might not. 
Regarding environmental coercion, there is still uncertainty about how impactful this will be 
for future generations, both because of scientific uncertainties and because we still have 
options to mitigate climate change. 
 
To conclude, including the direct manipulation of options in the concept of coercion is 
plausible, because it limits freedom (understood as the exercise of autonomy) similarly to 
threats. Yet, the question is where to draw the line on how impactful the action must be. 
Drawing this line is more difficult for the coerciveness of the direct limitation of options than 
for threats. While threats often make someone do something specific, the direct limitation of 
options is more suited to prevent certain actions than to make someone do something. The 
former is more easily recognizable as an instance of coercion than the latter, especially when 
the restriction of some options still leaves variable other alternatives open.  
 
Intentionality and agency 
Blake’s account of coercion requires that coercive actions are intentional and enacted by an 
agent. In the previous chapter, we have seen that not all options for intergenerational coercion 
meet these requirements. I have assumed that both criteria can be broadened to solve these 
problems. If we do that, do we still have a plausible account of coercion? 
 
In chapter three, I have suggested that the strict intentionality requirement can be replaced 
with the weaker requirement of knowingly accepting the coercive consequences of one’s 
actions. Some kind of intentionality requirement is common in accounts of coercion. It is 
meant to express that the coercer not just affects the options of the coercee, but does so with a 
disregard for their autonomy.116 The strict interpretation expresses this disregard most clearly: 
the coercer deliberately manipulates the coercee’s options. However, one might reject such a 
strict notion of intentionality, because it allows the coercer to brush off accusations by saying 
he did not mean to cause any coercive consequences. The weaker requirement of knowingly 
accepting the consequences is more objective, while still retaining the purpose of the 
requirement of intention. When you know, or could know, that your actions have significant 
negative effects for someone and perform them nonetheless, you disregard their autonomy. 
An example about agricultural subsidies illustrates the plausibility of the weaker 
requirement.117 Under the strict intentionality requirement, EU and US agricultural subsidies 
are not coercive. Even though they can greatly damage the options of farmers in developing 
countries for earning a living, this coercive consequence is not the specific intent of these 
subsidies. Under the weaker requirement, these subsidies are potentially coercive, because the 
EU and the US know that these are consequences of the subsidies and maintain the subsidy 
schemes anyway. 
 
 
116 Blake 2001, p. 268. 
117 Example by Pevnick 2008, p. 407. 
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In the case of climate change, no single agent can be identified as the coercer. Therefore, I 
have proposed to broaden the agency requirement and allow for a non-agentic approach to 
coercion. Is this plausible? Valentini offers such a non-agentic approach. She proposes that 
coercion can take place through a system of formal or informal (social) rules.118 Such a 
system can encompass a broad set of phenomena, but it is crucial that the coercive 
consequences of its operation are foreseeable and avoidable. The system must be subject to 
some human control, although this control does not rest with an identifiable agent. The 
responsibility for systemic coercion is therefore shared by all individuals that support the 
system through their actions.119 I will not go into the plausibility of systemic accounts further, 
since this topic touches on a complicated debate about agency that I cannot discuss here. I will 
limit myself to pointing out that non-agentic or systemic accounts of coercion are unorthodox, 
but exist. An argument in favor of including systemic coercion into the concept of coercion is 
that such informal systems of rules can also restrict freedom and do that in a similar way to 
typical cases of coercion. An example Valentini gives is racial discrimination. There is no 
specific agent responsible for it and yet discrimination can have immense effects on the 
ability of racial minorities to live an autonomous life.120 So, if coercion is at the core the 
restriction of freedom, or autonomy, we have a good reason to include systemic coercion. 
 
The necessity and authorship requirement 
The necessity and authorship requirement are not constituting requirements for coercion, but 
are required for triggering principles of justice, according to Nagel and Blake. In the previous 
chapter, we saw that some of the options for intergenerational coercion cannot satisfy these 
criteria. In this section, I will argue that abandoning these criteria is plausible. Both criteria 
can be objected in a similar manner: precisely in those cases when coercion does not take 
place in the name and interest of those coerced and when it is not necessary, we need 
principles of justice. 
 
Various authors have already argued that Nagel’s authorship requirement should be 
abandoned.121 They criticize the requirement for having perverse consequences: “it implies 
that a state can exempt itself from the demands of justice simply by ensuring that the coercion 
to which it subjects persons is pure coercion without any pretense of accountability”.122 Even 
some forms of state coercion do not seem to meet Nagel’s criterion. It seems that a tyrant 
would be able to “exempt himself from the demands of justice by relying solely on pure 
coercion.”123 Surely, Nagel would not agree that a tyrant does not have any obligations of 
justice to his citizens. Yet, it is difficult to see how the rule of a totalitarian tyrant could be 
regarded as in the interest of his citizens. It seems more plausible to say that all those coerced 
are owed justification, not only those in whose name or interest the coercion is enacted. If 
 
118 Valentini 2011, p. 212-213. 
119 Valentini 2011b, p. 152. 
120 Valentini 2011b, p. 143-144. 
121 See for example: Abizadeh 2007, p. 351-352; Julius 2006, p. 178-184; Barry and Valentini 2009, p. 495-96 
and Cohen and Sabel 2006, p. 166-169. 
122 Abizadeh 2007, p. 352. 
123 Abizadeh 2007, p. 352. 
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anything, those who are coerced while that is not in their interest are owed justification even 
more.  
 
A similar argument can be made for rejecting the necessity criterion. This criterion holds that 
the application of a coercive mechanism that is not in any shape or form necessary for the 
protection of the subject’s autonomy cannot trigger principles of justice, but needs to be 
eliminated instead. I agree with Blake that coercive mechanisms which cannot be justified, 
should be eliminated. Yet, why would there be no special obligations of justice as long as the 
unjustifiable coercion persists? Consider as an example the kidnapping of a child. Kidnapping 
is generally unjustifiable. However, that does not mean that as long as the kidnapper 
(wrongly) holds the child, he does not have any special obligations to the child. For example, 
he is obligated to make sure the child is fed, gets enough sleep and is otherwise healthy. So, 
the kidnapper has special obligations, even though his actions are unjustifiable. The same 
could be said for unnecessary coercive mechanisms. These cannot be justified and should 
therefore be eliminated, just like the kidnapper should not kidnap a child in the first place. 
However, as long as the coercion persists, the coercer does incur special obligations towards 
those he coerces, just like the kidnapper towards the child. If this is correct, the necessity 
requirement is only a necessary condition for justification and not for triggering obligations of 
distributive justice. 
 
In conclusion, there is a good case for abandoning the authorship requirement and the 
necessity requirement. It is plausible that obligations of justice are owed precisely when 
coercion is unjustified and not in the name and interest of those who are coerced.  
 
4.2 Implications for the global realm 
 
We have seen that the most straightforward interpretation of Blake and Nagel’s requirements 
for justice-triggering coercion, produced some difficulties in the intergenerational realm. A 
possible explanation for these difficulties, apart from the specific features of the 
intergenerational realm, is that both Blake and Nagel’s accounts of coercion specifically aim 
to defend statist conclusions about the scope of justice. The requirements for justice-triggering 
coercion mean to distinguish the domestic and the global realm. In response to his 
cosmopolitan critics, who argue that relevant forms of coercion do exist globally and thus that 
coercion theory does support global egalitarian justice, Blake writes: “This charge would, if 
true, undercut most of the appeal of coercion theory. What has made coercion theory useful, I 
think, has been that it allows us to distinguish between the local norms of distributive justice, 
and the universal norms of respect for autonomy that hold internationally. If these supposedly 
local norms hold universally, however, it is no longer clear that coercion theory has any 
particular benefits.”124  
 
As I have discussed above, the intergenerational account is in various aspects broader than 
Blake and Nagel’s original account. This move to accommodate the intuition that we should 
 
124 Blake 2011, p. 565. 
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care for future people, has a spill-over effect to the global realm. Broadening or abandoning 
requirements that were made to distinguish the domestic and the global realm makes it likelier 
to find acts or systems internationally that meet the criteria for justice-triggering coercion.  
 
Multiple authors have already used this strategy in the global domain. They have argued that 
there are relevant coercive acts internationally and that coercion theory is therefore only 
consistent when the scope of justice is extended to the global realm.125 Valentini has 
developed a comprehensive ‘broader’ account of coercion. I already mentioned a few 
elements of her account earlier. According to Valentini, the coercion view entails that “the 
function of principles of socioeconomic justice is to justify state coercion by making it 
compatible with each citizen’s freedom.”126 She argues that it is wrong to focus exclusively on 
state coercion. Outside of the state, constraints on freedom that stand in need of justification 
also exist.127 To accommodate these other constraints on freedom as well, she proposes a 
broader notion of coercion. 
 
Valentini starts with the ‘narrow’ account of coercion: “An agent A coerces another agent B if 
A intentionally forces B to do, or refrain from doing, X through a command backed by the 
threat of sanctions.” Next, she relaxes some of the criteria in this account. First, she argues 
that not only threats can be coercive, but also other constraints of freedom.128 These 
constraints should be non-trivial and should restrict freedom in comparison to a suitable 
baseline. Secondly, she replaces the intentionality requirement with the requirement of 
foreseeability and avoidability. The coercive consequence of an action does not have to be 
intended, but the coercer must have been able to foresee and avoid it. Thirdly, she allows for 
‘systemic coercion’. This is a form of coercion which is not exercised by an individual agent 
or a group agent, but takes place through a system of rules. This system may be comprised of 
formal or informal practices, as long as they follow a ‘recognizably rule-governed pattern’. 
The agents who are responsible for this systemic coercion are those who support the system 
through their actions and behavior. In contrast to Blake and Nagel, Valentini’s account of 
coercion identifies relevant forms of coercion that exist globally, so according to her account, 
the scope of justice is global. 
 
Now I will return to the ‘intergenerational coercion account’. This account is similar to 
Valentini’s account. Firstly, the intergenerational coercion account replaces the intentionality 
condition with the weaker condition of knowledgeability, while Valentini replaces it with the 
weaker condition of foreseeability. Although one might argue that foreseeability is even 
weaker than knowledgeability, both are weaker than intentionality in the strict sense. 
Secondly, both the intergenerational coercion account and Valentini’s account relax the 
agency requirement. Systemic coercion can also trigger obligations of justice. Thirdly, both 
accounts lack the ‘necessity-requirement’ and Nagel’s authorship requirement. Coercive 
 
125 See: Valentini 2011; Pevnick 2008; Cohen and Sabel 2006; Julius 2006; Abizadeh 2007 and Van Parijs 2007, 
p. 48. 
126 Valentini 2011, p. 208. 
127 Valentini 2011, p. 209. 
128 Valentini 2011, p. 210. 
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mechanisms that are ‘unnecessary’, as well as instances of ‘pure’ coercion can trigger 
obligations of justice. If the accounts are indeed similar enough that they identify a similar 
group of actions as coercive, then the intergenerational coercion account also applies to the 
global realm, like Valentini’s account.  
 
If the intergenerational account is correct, it follows that there are relevant forms of coercion 
in the global realm as well as in the domestic and intergenerational realm.129 That means that 
the scope of justice extends to the global realm as well. This puts the statist coercion theorist 
in a dilemma. To be consistent, he would need to choose between (1) committing to the 
narrow account of coercion and accepting that there are no obligations of justice to future 
people, or (2) committing to the intergenerational account of coercion and accepting that there 
are obligations of justice to non-compatriots. This is a dilemma because the first option does 
not correspond with our intuition about justice in the intergenerational domain and the second 
option does not correspond with the statist position. According to Blake, accepting extensive 
international obligations of justice would take away the fundamental purpose of coercion 
theory. He could try to escape the dilemma by denying that the first option does not 
correspond with our intuitions. While we do not have egalitarian duties of justice to future 
generations, we do owe them more limited humanitarian duties, related to the protection of 
autonomy. The argument would be that these duties suffice to account for our intuitions 
regarding our obligations to future generations. Yet, a concern could be that these 
humanitarian duties would not be given enough priority to adequately protect the interests of 
future generations. According to Barry, framing duties in terms of distributive justice gives 
them more weight and priority. 130  
 
In conclusion, broadening the coercion-account to accommodate our intuitions regarding 
intergenerational obligations of justice has a spill-over effect on our obligations in the global 
realm. 
 
  
 
129 For instance, border coercion did not trigger obligations of justice internationally because it does not satisfy 
Nagel’s authorship requirement, but if this requirement is dropped it might. The coercion of poor states by 
powerful states did not trigger obligations of justice because it was not in some form necessary, but if this 
requirement is dropped, it might too. 
130 See Barry 1978, p. 205. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I have explored the implications of the coercion view on the ground of justice 
for the intergenerational realm. The main question was: “Can a view which grounds 
obligations of justice in coercion plausibly claim that relevant forms of coercion exist in the 
intergenerational realm?” In this final conclusion, I will briefly recap my findings and answer 
the research question.  
 
In chapter two, I have explained the accounts of coercion by Blake and Nagel, who have 
defended the coercion approach to the ground of justice. This approach holds that we owe 
obligations of justice to people we share a coercive relationship with. In chapter three, I  
have investigated whether we can claim that a coercive relationship exists between present 
and future people. I have discussed three options that could establish that coercive 
relationship: legal, environmental and financial coercion. I concluded that it is possible to 
claim that present generations coerce future generations in these three ways, but only when 
certain assumptions are made about the correct interpretation of the requirements for justice-
triggering coercion. Most importantly, the concept of coercion needs to include the direct 
manipulation of options. Besides, even if these assumptions are made, the existence of a 
coercive relationship still depends on contingent facts about how present generations in each 
specific state affect future generations. 
 
In the fourth chapter, I have assessed whether the assumptions that needed to be made to 
establish a justice-triggering coercive relationship between present and future generations are 
plausible. This task is difficult, since there are many competing conceptions of coercion. I 
have taken the restriction of freedom as the common core of the concept. In this view, what 
connects coercion to justice is that it restricts freedom and therefore requires justification. 
This focus on freedom allows for a broader definition of coercion than is commonly used. A 
narrower view on coercion excludes actions that do constrain freedom significantly, in a way 
that is similar to more typical instances of coercion. A broader view on coercion, which 
results from relaxing and abandoning some of Blake and Nagel’s requirements, characterizes 
more freedom-restricting actions as coercion. A remaining question is how much impact these 
actions must have to be coercive. Some ways in which present generations negatively affect 
the freedom of future generations will have enough impact to be identified as coercion and 
others will not. Additionally, I have suggested that accepting the intergenerational coercion 
account has spill-over effects to global justice. Accepting this account would mean that the 
scope of justice is not only intergenerational, but also global. 
 
The thesis question should be answered positively: a view which grounds obligations of 
justice in coercion can plausibly claim that relevant forms of coercion exist in the 
intergenerational realm. There is a plausible concept of coercion, that can satisfy the intuition 
that we have certain obligations of justice to future generations. I encourage further discussion 
on the validity of this account of coercion and its implications for the global domain.  
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